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ABSTRACT 
 
Cloud technology is a nascent technology, thriving in information communication and 
data storage, and is still under development. Securing the communication links and data 
has been very paramount to the development of this technology and system. Various 
techniques, methods and technologies have been implemented in order to secure this 
system. Security of the cloud has recently witnessed much attention, as there have on-
going research and studies towards the development of more potent solutions. 
Cryptography is one of the feasible and in demand solutions here, as it offers a set of 
security measures such as confidentiality, integrity and availability.  
This thesis work is aimed at understanding the data security in the cloud systems, and 
the various security threats associated with such technology. To better understand this, a 
thorough literature review is conducted on a cloud technology, and some of the cloud 
attacks are simulated. The distributed denial of service is simulated using NS3 and 
EstiNet, ARP poisoning is simulated using Ettercap, and the SQL injection is simulated 
using Damn Vulnerable Web Application. At the end of the task, the simulation 
scenarios were analyzed for better understanding and the observations were concluded. 
It was found out that these attacks are threat to the communication channels, network 
bandwidth, and the information being transferred. It was also realized that these attacks 
could be managed effectively using appropriate cryptographic techniques or 
technologies to block any unauthorised access to the network. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS:  cloud systems, cryptography, information security, cloud attacks, 
simulations, NS3, Ettercap, EstiNet.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cloud computing is defined as the practice of using computing resources and services 
deployed on the Internet to manage, store and process data on demand instead of the 
local server. There are many existing types following this model, such as the platform as 
a service (PaaS), infrastructure as a service (IaaS), software as a service (SaaS) and any 
other services that could be moved to the cloud. The term data storage is the act or 
means of storing data (information) for present or future use. The need for data storage 
is fast growing, and the demand for the service is also increasing. There are many ways 
of storing data, for example, stored in an external hard drive, magnetic disk, magnetic 
tape, memory sticks and/or on the cloud, for big data storage, accessible from anywhere, 
and for further processing capabilities. In the market level, there are quite a few compa-
nies rendering data or information storage systems, among whom are Microsoft offering 
Azure, Amazon data Storage, Alibaba cloud Virtual Hosting, SugarSync, Carbonite, 
IDrive, BackBlaze, Dropbox, Tresorit and others for commercial purposes. 
 
Cloud computing is a trending topic in Information Technology (IT), with which much 
research and innovation are going on currently. The field focuses on the development of 
IT infrastructures and resources to provide better and new architectures for the storage 
system. The term cloud computing was defined by Gerald Kaefer of Siemens Technolo-
gy as the model to allow easy on-demand network access to a shared pool of customiza-
ble computing resources (like servers, storage, applications and services, networks) 
which can be made available quickly and allowed with little management influence or 
service provider reciprocal actions.  
 
Cloud computing can be classified into four common models; the public, private, com-
munity and hybrid clouds.  The cloud computing makes use of virtualization technolo-
gy, which is a new technology aimed at reducing business costs and encourages multi-
tenancy. Virtualization is one of the basic technologies to make cloud computing func-
tion properly. There are different types of virtualization, among whom are data virtual-
ization (which enables organizations to have processing capabilities to gather data to-
gether from different sources and process according to user demand at the appropriate 
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time), desktop virtualization (permits central administrator to carry out multiple config-
urations, updates and security tests on all virtual desktops), server virtualization (ena-
bling a server to carry out multiple specific functions upon partitioning into different 
components) and Operating system virtualization (enables the deployment of different 
operating systems on a single machine) (Red Hat Inc. 2018). It is a technology that dis-
sociates functions from hardware and cloud computing depends on this separation. This 
new technology is no different than previous ones, as with the benefits it brings, fea-
tures, and it also comes with a new set of security challenges. This is the aim of this re-
search work.   
 
Due to the significant increase in the amount of data and resources being utilized by 
consumers from the public and private sectors, there have been questions for tighter and 
more robust cloud services. We require security to prevent unauthorized access to data 
being stored either for private or for commercial purposes. Protecting data is crucial, 
and is a way of protecting its confidentiality, integrity and authenticity (CIA) against 
attack.  
The verification of the access to the storage system is a way of keeping data safe from 
any user of the services or the system resources. The complexity of the cloud system is 
based on its architecture, and the importance associated with its use, which requires a 
strong security and authentication algorithms in order to avoid economic loss. There are 
several ways of securing a cloud data storage system, among the commonly used securi-
ty and authentication algorithms are, the cryptographic algorithm, intelligent based au-
thentication, firewall creation and others. 
 
Data security is critical to the development of cloud system and unarguably a major 
concern in IT, this is because data are located everywhere in various machines and 
storage facilities. It is therefore important that the cloud service providers protect the 
essential qualities, the CIA, of data by implementing some security measures such as 
cryptographic techniques which use algorithms to authenticate data and keeping them 
secret. This implementation has been effective over the years and it is still in use. The 
cryptographic technique protects data by encryption and the security technique could be 
offered either by symmetric, asymmetric or mixture of both (Ankit Jain 2004).   
13 
 
 
Cryptography, authentication, and authorization techniques can be tested by means of 
implementing them using simulators. Basically, the simulators are designed using math-
ematical formulas, algorithms, models to imitate real-life network models in a virtual 
environment. There are several tools that are being used to simulate the various cloud 
attacks; these are used for research, academic and industrial purposes. Some of the tools 
are available as open source and for commercial use. The commercially available simu-
lating tools are mostly used by companies to analyse their various networks; academic 
institutions for teaching, and research purposes, and for individuals to learn more about 
security on their own. Choosing a simulator depends on the user’s interest, either to ana-
lyse the quality of service, measure the throughput, understand the network performance 
or to measure effects of various attacks on the computer networks. 
 
This thesis is aimed at getting a better understanding of the security challenges in the 
cloud system. This will be achieved by studying cloud computing, data security, and by 
simulating different cloud attacks using different simulating tools like Network 
Simulator 3 (NS3), EstiNet, Ettercap and Damn Vulnerability Web Application 
(DVWA). At the end of this thesis, the project would be able to answer the following 
questions: 
• What are the security threats to the cloud system? 
• What are the various cloud attacks? 
• What are effects of these attacks on communication systems? 
• Why and how cryptographic techniques could be implemented in the cloud 
security? 
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2. CLOUD SYSTEM 
 
 
2.1. Cloud Architecture  
 
The cloud storage architecture can be classified into four different actors, which are the 
data owner, the user, the cloud server and the third-party auditor (Vairagade Sachin et. 
al 2012). This is represented in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1. Typical Cloud Storage Architecture (Yassin Ali A. et al 2014). 
 
The User(s) could be individual, private or commercial organisations, who depend on 
the remote cloud server for storage, maintenance and protection of their data while the 
Cloud Service Provider is/are responsible for the storage, maintenance and the protec-
tion of data being sent by the user. The Third-party Auditor has authorized bodies who 
have rights to access the cloud storage security, the remote cloud server upon authoriza-
tion of the data owner (Yassin Ali A. et al 2014). 
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2.2. Cloud Models 
 
2.2.1. The Public Cloud 
 
It is a cloud infrastructure owned by an organization selling cloud services and made 
accessible to the public.  The resources are rendered on-demand basis and dynamically 
over the Internet. The model allows both small and medium-sized enterprises to manage 
their businesses and reduce the creation of more data centres. The model features have 
the following benefits: 
 
i. helps companies to save costs from spending too much on purchasing, managing 
and maintaining own On-premises IT resources. 
ii. scalable to meet user’s needs and workload. 
iii.  reduces resources wastage because consumers only pay per usage.  
iv. can also be set up faster compared to the on-premises infrastructures. 
 
2.2.2. The Private Cloud 
 
It is a cloud infrastructure managed mainly by an organization on their own private net-
work. It could also be managed by a third party either on or off premises. Virtual private 
cloud happens to be a good solution for maintaining a cost-effective steady task (Online 
Tech Inc, 2018) and highlighted some other benefits such as: 
 
i. designed to ensure a high level of security by means of preventing other custom-
ers in the same data centre from connecting, as the cloud is assigned to a single 
user. 
ii. its IT resources (hardware, network, and storage) performance can be defined 
and personalized in the private cloud. 
iii. offers use on-demand like the public cloud. 
iv. complies with (Payment Card Industry) PCI, (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act) HIPAA, and Sarbanes Oxley standards and regulations, 
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which are offered through a virtual private network, or completely private cloud 
for an assigned user. 
v. can be deployed quickly, and highly scalable to meet changing needs. 
 
2.2.3. The Community Cloud 
 
This is also a cloud infrastructure being managed by several organizations and supports 
certain group sharing a common goal (for example mission, policy, compliance, regula-
tions etc). 
 
2.2.4. The Hybrid Cloud 
 
This cloud infrastructure is the combination of two or more private, or public clouds 
services joined together by a standard technology for data and application flexibility as 
a single service. Hybrid cloud allows an organization to use wider varieties of IT ser-
vices. The benefits it offers are:  
 
i. allows companies to implement on-premises private cloud to host confidential 
workloads and deploy third-party public cloud to host less sensitive resources. 
ii. ability and support for big data processing. 
iii. allows companies to use a wider mix of IT services. 
 
 
2.3. The Cloud Computing Architecture 
 
The cloud computing architecture refers to a written permission, a document that allows 
communication between stakeholders, earlier high-level design decisions documenta-
tions, components, design reuse and patterns between projects in cloud systems (Gerald 
Kaefer 2010). According to Gerald Kaefer, cloud computing architecture, as shown in 
Figure 2 below, is also defined as the structure of the system that consists of on-
premises and cloud resources, services, software components, geo-location and the rela-
tionships between them.  
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Figure 2. Cloud Computing Architecture (Gerald Kaefer 2010). 
 
 
2.4. The Cloud Computing Services and Characteristics 
 
These are Information Technology services made available to the end-users upon re-
quest. The services can be categorized into Platform as a Service (PaaS), Infrastructure 
as a Service (IaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS). The cloud service models are as 
described in Figure 3 below. SaaS is an on-demand software, in which applications are 
presented by the service provider and accessible by the end user over the Internet (Ste-
phen R. et al 2012: p10) e.g. Microsoft office 365, Salesforce and others. PaaS is the 
rendering of operating systems and other attached services over the Internet without the 
need to download or install (Stephen R. et al 2012: p10). Given examples are the Mi-
crosoft Azure, Elastic Beanstalk and Amazon Web Services. Finally, IaaS is a form of 
cloud computing for rendering virtualized computing resources provided by the service 
provider hosting the infrastructural components normally available in an on-premises 
data centre such as; storage, servers and networking hardware, and made accessible on 
the Internet (Michelle Boisvert and Stephen J. Bigelow 2013). IBM Bluemix, Microsoft 
Azure and Amazon Web Services are common examples.   
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Figure 3. Typical Cloud Service Model (Arron Fu 2017) 
 
The most common characteristics of typical cloud systems are: 
i. It provides computing services itself on demand without any influ-
ence from human or the service provider. 
ii. It has a large network, which can be accessible by any electronic 
device regardless of place and time. 
iii. It has large computing resources like network bandwidth, power 
and so on, in the physical or virtual pools, that can be assigned au-
tomatically on demand by the authorized end-user. 
iv. It features unlimited capability for self-growth as the demand 
grows. 
v. The services are readily available without any interruption. They 
are regularly monitored, controlled and managed.  
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3. CLOUD SECURITY 
 
The cloud computing security is a rapidly growing service which is offering many of the 
same purposes as the conventional IT security such as securing important information 
from unauthorized access, leakage and data obliteration (amazon web services Inc, 
2018).  Software-based security appliances are being used to oversee and guide infor-
mation flowing in and out of the cloud resources and it is not compulsory to own physi-
cal storage facilities or servers. Cloud services are being governed by different bodies 
and parastatals according to the law of the country in which the data centres are located 
and with strict regulatory standards. 
 
 
3.1. Cloud Computing and Security Challenges 
 
The reasons for the use of cryptographic encryption algorithms are to ensure security 
and to protect the integrity of data in the cloud storage. The encryption techniques are 
applied to achieve the data protection standards, which are; confidentiality (blocking 
unauthorised access to protected data), integrity (protecting data from illegal 
modification or deletion), availability (data is available to authorised personnel on 
request), authorization (only authorised user has access to the data), and non-repudiation 
(that the sender can not deny that the data/information is being sent from him/her) of the 
secured data. The term encryption is the method of converting a readable text into an 
unreadable text (meaningless text) using special key and decryption is vice versa. The 
most commonly used private keys are the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) and the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) 
(AbdElnapi et al 2016).  
The cryptographic algorithms can be categorized into symmetric, asymmetric, and 
hybrid algorithms. The symmetric algorithm, which is known as private key encryption, 
is a method of encrypting and decrypting data using one common key. This is illustrated 
in Figure 4 below 
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Figure 4. Typical Symmetric Private Key Cryptography (Stallings 2011) 
 
On the other hand, the asymmetric algorithm uses two different keys, the private and 
public keys, for encryption and decryption respectively. This is illustrated in Figure 5 
below. 
 
Figure 5. Typical Asymmetric Key Cryptography (Stallings 2011) 
 
In its hybrid model, two or more algorithms are combined and used simultaneously. 
This model is the most effective encryption algorithm to avoid brute force attack and to 
apply confidentiality to shared data. It works in such a way that the receiver has the 
private key and the sender has received the public key, similar to the SSL/TLS protocol 
in the web browser security; where the web browser has the capability to generate a 
random symmetric key, encrypt it with the public key and then send it to the server. 
In more details, Data Encryption Standard is a commonly used encryption algorithm 
until now. It is published as FIPS-46 in the Federal Register by National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) in January 1977 (Khan Shakeeba et al 2015). It uses 
a 64- bit block and a 56-bits key size algorithm. The DES block cipher as shown in 
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Figure 6 below uses a key for encryption and decryption, and the algorithm is 
administered to a block of a data concurrently instead of serving one bit at a time. DES 
uses the 64-bit key, but eight of the key are used for parity checks productively reducing 
the key to 56-bits. Therefore, it would require a maximum of 256 guesses to get the 
correct key. 
 
 
Figure 6. DES Block Cipher (Khan Shakeeba et al 2015) 
 
AES was published in 2001 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. It is 
a symmetric block cipher which intends to replace the Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
because of the latter’s well-known security weaknesses such as brute-force attacks for 
instance. The operations in AES are performed on byte basis. The algorithm makes use 
of mathematical operations such as addition, division and multiplication operations in 
AES are performed over the Galois Field GF(28). The key length of an AES can be 16, 
24, or 32 bytes as in AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 block ciphers respectively for 
encryption and decryption. The AES operational structure is shown in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7. AES Structure (Stallings, 2011: p175) 
 
The cipher features N of rounds that depend solely on the length of the key in use, e.g. 
10 rounds for a 16-byte key, 12 rounds for a 24-byte key and 14 rounds for a 32-byte 
key. The round steps in AES are; substitute bytes (replacing each byte by byte indexed 
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by row and column of a 16x16 table), shift rows (byte circular shift to the left. such that, 
the first row is fixed, second row shifts by 1 byte to the left, third row shifts 2 bytes to 
the left and fourth row shifts 3 bytes to the left), mix column (matrix multiplication in 
GF(28) using prime polynomial m(x) = x8+x4+x3+x+1), and add round keys (XOR state 
with 128-bits of the round key) (Stallings 2011: p176). The first N-1 rounds consist of 
four different transformation functions: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and 
AddroundKeys, which are implemented as shown in Figure 8. For the final round, it has 
only three transformations, with initial single transformation (AddRoundKey) before the 
first round (Stallings 2011: p177). 
 
 
Figure 8. AES Encryption and Decryption (Stallings 2011: p178) 
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According to Stallings, to decrypt, we use inverse operations in many transformations. 
The key that is given as the input is then spread into an array of forty-four 32-bit words, 
w[i]. Four different words (128bits) are used as a round key for each round. The cipher 
starts with an AddRoundKey stage and then by nine rounds which also contain all the 
four stages followed by the tenth round of three stages for both encryption and decryp-
tion. This can also be seen in the encryption rounds shown in Figure 9 below. 
 
 
Figure 9. AES Encryption rounds (Stallings 2011: p179) 
 
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) was developed in 1991, and it is now 
free of use. The algorithm makes use of symmetric block cipher, with 128 bits key and 
sub-keys are 16 bits. It has a block size of 64 which is divided into four 16-bit sub-
blocks. The operations being used in IDEA are XOR, addition modulo and 
multiplication modulo. The decryption works similarly as the encryption, but rather the 
round key order is reversed.  
Another form of symmetric block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier in 1993 is called 
Blowfish. It takes a variable-length key from 32 bits to 448 bits and it is a replacement 
of DES or IDEA and also faster than the two. 
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Also, Rivest Cipher 5 (RC5) is another symmetric-key block cipher algorithm which is 
considered secure. It has a 32, 64 or 128 bits block size, a key size of up to 2040 
maximum, and 0-255 number of rounds. It was developed in 1994,  iterative in 
structure, suitable for hardware or software, and easy to interpret due to its simple 
framework. 
Additionally, triple DES (3-DES) is another symmetric encryption algorithm. It uses 
three definite DES keys with a total length of 168 bits. 3-DES works by taking three 56 
bits keys (K1, K2 and K3), encrypting first with K1, decrypting next with K2 and 
encrypting with K3 for the last time (Jon Callas, 2004). 3-DES is weaker and slower 
than blowfish or AES. In table 1, the comparison among these cryptographic algorithms 
is given. 
 
Table 1. Cryptography Algorithms Comparison (Randeep Kaur et al 2014). 
 
 
 
3.2. The Cloud Data and its Security 
 
In cloud computing, data can be in three different states, which are data in use, data in 
transit and data at rest. The likely encryption algorithms which could be implemented to 
secure data in these states are also discussed in this section. 
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3.2.1. The Data in Use 
 
Data in use is when the data is in temporary channel or storage facility. At this state, 
data requires security and should be protected. Data in this state is more susceptible and 
can be easily attacked because of its availability to different legitimate users in need of 
it. The way by which to protect data in this state, putting into consideration that it needs 
to be decrypted at first, is by moving it to a temporal secure location, then by ensuring 
the availability of a secure channel to the expected destination for the final user. 
 
3.2.2. The Data in Transit 
 
Data in transit is when the data is moving across the network from one point to the oth-
er. Data is most liable to attack in this state. However, this can be protected by using 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), a protocol being used within the HTTPS, which is an up-
dated, improved version of its former one, Transport Layer Security (TLS). 
  
3.2.3. The Data at Rest 
 
Data at rest is when the data is finally stored in the final storage facility (network at-
tached storage (NAS), storage area network (SAN) and file servers), in the databases 
and file systems. In this state, to secure data, we may have to consider an effective algo-
rithm that could provide help in encrypting it at rest. Data at this state can be protected 
using AES, RSA and any other protocols.  
The Figure 10 below illustrates and explains data at the three different states further. 
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Figure 10. Data at the Three Different States (ViSolve IT Security Team 2015) 
 
 
Data at rest are mostly saved in the database. There are three major database vendors 
that provide database-level protection process in their products with the aim of encrypt-
ing the user-defined columns or the entire database files with a secure encryption algo-
rithm so that attackers will not be able to read data in files without discerning the en-
cryption key(s) (Martin Rakhmanov 2010). These three major database vendors are Or-
acle, Sybase and Microsoft. The database-level encryption functionality and a compari-
son between their characteristics are as shown in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2. Encrypting Data at Rest (Martin Rakhmanov 2010) 
 
Oracle 
Database 11.2 
Sybase 15.5 
Microsoft SQL 
Server 2008 
R2 
Supported Encryption  
Algorithm 
AES, Triple DES 
 
AES 
 
 
AES, Triple 
DES 
 
 
Supported Key Length 
 
 
128,192,256 bits for 
AES, 168 bits for Triple 
DES 
128, 192, 256 
bits 
 
 
 
128, 192, 256 
bits for AES, 
192 bits for 
Triple DES 
 
 
 
Encryption Scope Tablespace, Column Column 
Database 
(Page level) 
Key Assignment 
Granularity Key per table 
Key per col-
umn 
Key per data-
base 
Encryption Key Storage 
Wallet HSM (hardware 
security module), exter-
nal PKCS#11 compatible 
key management system, 
data dictionary, 
tablespace file 
Database (not 
necessarily 
encrypted 
one) Database 
Special Key Management 
Database Roles No Yes No 
Special Permission Re-
quired to Read Encrypted 
Data No Yes No 
        
Optional ‘salt’ Support to 
Protect against Pattern 
Analysis Yes Yes 
Entire files are 
encrypted: salt 
per value does 
not make sense 
 
 
Additionally, another commonly used method for encrypting and decrypting data is 
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). The encryption method uses symmetric and asymmetric 
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keys to encrypt data being transferred across networks. The encryption key based ap-
proach greatly helps to secure data since the data credentials are not stored in the same 
place where the secure data is saved. Therefore, upon failure or malicious access to the 
disk or the storage facility, an unauthorised user or hacker would have no means to de-
crypt and make use of the data. PGP provides such level of data protection by making 
use of digital signature. The digital signature is a digitally created and validation public 
key encryption code securely affixed to the electronically relayed document to certify its 
contents and the identity of the sender (DocuSign 2018). This offers additional security 
measure between the sender and the receiver. Most common secure digital signature 
compared to the less secure ones are shown in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3. Secure and Unsecured networks (UC Regents 2017) 
 Instead 
of…. 
Use…. 
Web 
Access 
HTTP HTTPS 
File 
transfer 
FTP, RCP FTPS, SFTP, SCP, 
WebDAV over HTTPS 
Remote 
Shell 
telnet SSH2 terminal 
Remote 
desktop 
VNC radmin, RDP 
 
 
3.3. The Attack Layers on the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Layer 
 
The OSI model is an essential structure of protocols that enables two or more devices to 
exchange data together across the network system. An individual layer of the model is 
obliged for accomplishing a certain operation. The TCP/IP Model is shown in Figure 
11. The model has seven OSI layers, the protocols in use in each layer respectively, for 
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example, TCP/UDP at the transport layer, Ethernet, token ring at the physical-data-link 
layer and so also, we have the protocol data unit (PDU) for each layer. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Typical TCP/IP Model (Jared Heinrich 2013) 
 
For this work, protocols are viewed from the TCP/IP model perspective taking into con-
sideration the Data Link, Internet, Transport, and Application layers. 
 
3.3.1. The Application Layer 
 
It provides certain functions directly to the user or to some other application programs 
(web browsers, communication programs and others), identifies communication part-
ners, and ensures required communication interfaces e.g. Ethernet occur on the sender’s 
machine, that is, synchronizes communication (Andrew Froehlich 2006, Teare Diane, 
1999). It depends on all other layers to carry out its processes and has protocols that tar-
get valid communication over an IP network. 
 
3.3.2. The Transport Layer 
 
This layer manages and creates packets over the network. It accepts data from the ses-
sion layer and segments the data for transport across the network (Teare Diane, 1999). 
There are two main protocols in this layer, which are the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP), and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). TCP allows the recipient to receive 
packets in order, as they are sent by the web server while on the other hand, UDP does 
not check error in the packet transmission.  
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3.3.3. The Network Layer 
 
This is a routing and network addressing layer, and it takes care of the IP addresses of 
the hosts and routing the data to another host(s) for network communication. Routers 
use this layer to decide how to forward packets and the layer also defines the network 
address, which is different from the MAC address, and the logical network layout 
(Teare Diane 1999). 
 
3.3.4. The Data Link Layer 
 
This layer carries the data in and out over the physical link in a network. The data link 
works with the non-routable addresses (MAC addresses). This layer is sub-divided into 
Logical Link Control (LLC) and the Media Access Control (MAC). In the data link lay-
er, data bits are encoded, decoded and organised before being carried as frames between 
two neighbouring nodes on the same local area network or wide area network. Data link 
layer takes care of the compliance, that is, the user receives the data accurately. 
 
 
3.4. The Cloud Security Challenges 
 
Cloud computing is a crucial technological development that makes use of virtualization 
technology, which is as an upgraded version of hardware resources by means of creating 
more virtual machines running on the same physical machine. This technological devel-
opment has come with security challenges due to its structure and design. The most vul-
nerable areas to attack in cloud computing are the virtual machines and the data itself, in 
which there are numerous forms of attacks among which the two most common ones 
are;  
i. The Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and  
ii. The service interruption due to security weaknesses.  
DDoS is the situation whereby an attacker targets multiple numbers of computer sys-
tems, the server(s), website or any other network services to make online services una-
vailable by bombarding them with infectious traffic. There are different types of DDoS 
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attacks tools; the Complex (Agobot, Mstream and Trinoo) and Simple (X-DoS and H-
DoS) (Sagar Aman et al 2013). The DDoS attacks could be in the form of extensible 
markup language (XML) supporting X-DoS and the Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) supporting H-DoS. In its first form, X-DoS attack opens the XML tags and 
consumes the system’s CPU while the latter attack sends irregular HTTP requests to the 
target web server and consumes the communication links (Sagar Aman et al 2013). 
Other types of attacks in cloud computing according to Oktay et al 2013 are;  
i. Attacks on the organization by the current or previous employ-
ee(s) holding access privileges to the company information sys-
tems. 
ii. Credential theft of an authorized user to gain access to the organi-
zation’s systems, in order to access vital information. 
iii. Port scanning in which the attacker looks for an open port and 
running services on an organization’s network connections to 
capture IP and MAC addresses. 
iv. A direct attack on virtual machines by means of using one virtual 
machine to attack another after one virtual machine’s hypervisor 
and control has been compromised. This is made possible since 
many virtual machines use the same resource pool. 
v. Deliberate alteration of data by an authorized personnel or system 
administrators for malicious purposes. 
The resources available to the attacker determine the nature of possible attacks he can 
carry out, therefore typical cryptographic attacks are designed to undermine the security 
of cryptographic algorithms, and are used to decrypt data without the previous 
knowledge of the decryption (Manikandasaran et al 2016). Also, Manikandasara et al in 
their journal highlighted some other attacks in cloud computing, which are: 
i. Ciphertext-Only Attack: It is presumed that the attacker has the 
knowledge of the encrypted message/data/text but not the plaintext. 
Therefore, the attacker depends on some guesses about the plaintext. 
ii. Known-Plaintext Attack: This is a situation whereby the cryptanalyst 
or an attacker has knowledge of the encryption algorithm, plaintext 
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and the ciphertext. He is therefore obliged to find out the key(s) used 
to encrypt or decrypt the text. 
iii. Chosen- Plaintext Attack: The cryptanalyst selects random plaintext 
to be encrypted and get the associated ciphertext. The analyst tries to 
get the secret key for the encryption or create an algorithm for 
decrypting the ciphertexts using the same key.  
iv. Chosen-Ciphertext Attack: The cryptanalyst analyses specific 
ciphertexts together with the associated plaintexts. The aim is to get 
the secret key or enough information about the system under attack.  
v. Meet-in-the-Middle Attack: It is among the types of the known 
plaintext attacks, in which the attacker knows some parts of the 
plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts. Here, the ciphertexts 
with many different secret keys for different encryptions of similar 
algorithms are easily broken. The scheme of meet-in-the-middle 
attack is described as shown in Figure 13 below; C = ciphertext, P = 
plain text, E= encryption algorithm, D = decryption algorithm, Ka and 
Kb = the two secret keys and 2
len(ka) - creating the table with all 
possible values of Ea(Ka,  P) (Chris Kowalczyk, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 12.  Typical meet-in-the-middle attack (Chris Kowalczyk, 2017) 
 
The attack illustrated in Figure 12 can be carried out in 2 steps as described by 
Chris Kowalczyk.  
Step 1: 
i. Form a table with all possible values for the left side of the equation 
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ii. Compute all possible ciphertexts of the known plaintext formed using 
the first secret key Ea(Ka, P). 
iii. Arrange the final table according to the computed ciphertexts, just to 
enhance subsequent searching. 
Step 2: 
i. Compute values of Db(Kb, C) for the other hand of the equation 
ii. Examine them with the values of the first side of the equation 
calculated earlier and saved in the table 
iii. The attacker looks for a pair of secret keys Ka and Kb for which the 
value Ea(Ka, P) found in the table and the just completed value of 
Db(Kb, C) are the same. 
 
vi. Cloud Malware Injection Attack: The attacker creates own infectious 
service implementation module, SaaS, PaaS or a virtual machine 
instance IaaS in the form of a decoy, and then injects it into the Cloud 
system. Once the attack succeeds, it automatically redirects the 
requests of the valid user to the infectious service, and then the 
attacker’s code begins to be executed. This attack is aimed at 
manipulating service-to-cloud attack area by either changing the data, 
causing a blockage or deletion, or disabling some of its 
functionalities. 
vii. SQL Injection Attack: It is an attack on data-driven applications, 
where dangerous SQL queries are infused for execution in the entry 
field to gain access to information that was not meant to be shown. 
 
3.5. The Research-based Security Solutions to Cloud Attacks  
 
Many techniques are proposed to solve the different security attacks mentioned earlier 
as stated in the following list for instance.  The different security techniques according 
to Bhalekar Seema B et  al  2014 are: 
i. Homomorphic token pre-combination: this is to obtain the 
integration of storage correctness insurance. Steps involved to 
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attain the security of user’s data are; file distribution preparation, 
token pre-computation (to identify the precision of the data 
storage), challenge the token function, and error localisation (to 
verify the exactness of the data saved on the cloud server) 
ii. Mobicloud: a  virtual machine for a mobile cloud framework, 
created for a consumer, with total control of the information kept 
on its virtual hard drive. The mobile framework for trust 
management and private data isolation are: 
• Mobile cloud trust management: user identification 
management, that allows an individual to have total 
control of identities, meaning that the user has control 
over data shared over the Internet, as well capabilities 
for transfer or deletion when required. 
• Multitenancy: user’s data is saved in one sizable 
database and an uncommon encryption key is used to 
secure data for each user. 
iii. Cryptographic technique: advanced cryptographic techniques 
such as ID-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC), 
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC), key 
guarantee encryption, threshold decryption, and Information 
Dispersal Algorithm (IDA)-based scheme for high data 
distribution. 
iv. Data integrity technique, that supplies key to data owner, and 
produces additional message verification code of the file provided 
by the data owner. 
v. Privacy-Preserving Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based-Encryption 
(PP-CP-ABE) scheme, and Attribute-Based Data Storage (ABDS) 
system. CP-ABE is used to expedite key management and 
cryptographic access control in an eloquent and effective way. 
The ABDS system scheme accomplishes expandable and smooth 
data access control, by means of using public cloud services. 
ABDS is applicable for mobile computing to ensure that 
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communication and storage overhead are balanced. The technique 
benefits from the reduced data management operations’ costs for 
both the mobile cloud nodes and storage service providers. 
vi. Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) algorithm, which renders secretiveness 
over the distinctive network nodes, and enhances the efficiency of 
processing cryptographic computational systems. 
vii. Elliptic curve cryptographic technique, which is key management 
solution that has been achieved as part of the machine-to-machine 
local cloud action plan.  
viii. The public key cryptographic technique, which offers protection 
against Internet-based attacks emanating from authentication; 
encryption, and decryption; and decryption verification among 
others. 
ix. Hybrid textual authentication technique, and Computers Privacy 
and Data Protection (CPDP) are authentication solutions for 
users’ security in any multi-cloud environment, and they protect 
against dictionary attacks. The CPDP is used for data security and 
integrity stored in the cloud. 
x. Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and Cloud Intrusion Detection 
System Service technique are used to detect dangerous code, 
minimize resources usage on mobile appliances, and minimize 
software intricacy of mobile appliances. The techniques offer 
considerable security and flexibility during data exchange in the 
cloud. 
In summary, Table 4 below shows the different security techniques and the different 
solutions they offer. 
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Table 4. Security Technique and their Solution (Bhalekar Seema B et al 2014). 
Technique Solution 
CPDP Scheme 
Provides security and integrity to data stored in 
the cloud 
IDS and Collaborative Intrusion De-
tections (CIDSs) Scheme 
Better detection of malicious code, reduced 
consumption and reduced software complexity 
of mobile devices 
Advanced Cryptographic Technique 
Provides data privacy protection or secure 
cloud storage 
Asymmetric Key Approach Confidentiality and integrity of the data 
RC-4 Confidentiality over the different network 
nodes nodes Message Digest 5 (MD5), Unicode 
Transformation Format 8 (UTF8) Enhance the security 
Pre-computed Token Scheme Data storage correctness, and error localization 
 
 
3.6. The Key Exchange Algorithm 
The usage of cryptographic algorithm services, incorporates more than one entities, and 
requires the share of one another’s public keys for authentication. This could be seen in 
the Web server authenticating its identity to the Web browsers. Key exchange is a class 
of protocols, that allows two entities to share a long-term secret or at least one public 
key in order to establish a short-term shared secret (Tim Rains 2015). The algorithm 
makes use of both symmetric and asymmetric protocols. Some examples of key 
exchange as being used in Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 protocols are IPSec, 
Schannel, and Kerberos v5 (Corey Plett et al 2016). 
The handshake protocol and the record layer are the two main sub-protocols in the TLS 
protocol (Nick Sullivan et al 2015). There are two main types of authentication and key 
establishment mechanisms in handshake protocol, which are RSA-based, and Diffie-
Hellman-based (Nick Sullivan et al 2015). According to Nick Sullivan, an ephemeral 
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Diffie-Hellman handshake is an alternative form of the TLS handshake, and it uses two 
different mechanisms, one for establishing a shared pre-master secret, and the other one 
for authenticating the server. The key feature that this relies on, is the Diffie-Hellman 
key agreement algorithm.  
 
Figure 13: TLS Handshake Overview (IBM Corporation 1999, 2014) 
 
The overview of the TLS handshake in Figure 13 shows the establishment of TLS client 
and server secret keys that they use for communication. The client TLS authenticates 
server certificate and checks the cryptographic parameters, while the server TLS verifies 
the client certificate if needed. 
The exchange algorithms between the user (person A), the provider (person B) and the 
public key g, could work as follows: 
i. person A has secret A, sends gA to person B 
ii. person B has secret B, sends gB to person a 
iii. person A computes (gB)A 
iv. person B computes (gA)B 
v. Both A and B end up with gAB, which is their shared secret 
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The given algorithm is similar to the TLS handshake shown earlier in Figure 13. How-
ever, this does not work well with regular numbers because gAB has the tendency to get 
large, but there are suitable ways to take the n-th root of a number. Nonetheless, there 
are techniques to overcome this shortage. This is done by using modular arithmetic, 
which is always dividing the result of the calculation by a large prime number and tak-
ing the remainder (Sullivan Nick 2014). 
Furthermore, the Diffie Hellman, notably a public key algorithm, has the capability to 
generate such shared secret key. The asymmetric keys, which are randomly selected 
from a set of keys with certain properties, conform with the asymmetric algorithm in 
such a way that two users would probably not generate similar keys, with key sizes 
commonly ranging from 512 to 4096 bits. 
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4. THE SIMULATORS OVERVIEW 
 
Simulators are commonly software-defined programmes, that mostly use discrete-event 
simulation to model the behaviour or performance of a system or a network at different 
scenarios, under changing state variables at specific cases. There are many types of 
simulators, that are designed for different purposes, and supported by various technolo-
gies. Some of these simulators use GUI, while some are command-line driven, in which, 
both are available either as open sources, or they require commercial licensing. 
 
 
4.1. Network Simulator 3 (NS3) 
 
NS3 is a non-commercial software developed in C++, and python scripting interface, to 
improve the simulation productivity. It is designed for simulating discrete-event net-
work over the Internet, in a virtual environment mainly for companies contributing to 
the network improvement, academic research, and for personal use. 
The NS3 development (ns-3-dev) is hosted in an open-source code management tool 
available on different platforms (Windows, Linux and others) servers. The most recent 
version of the software is the ns-3.28, which was released in March 2018. The building 
tool for NS3 is web application firewall (WAF), which is a build automation tool de-
signed to help in the compilation and installation of computer software, and is written in 
python scripting language (Nagy Thomas 2018). 
 
4.1.1. NS3 Basic Architecture  
 
The basic NS3 architecture as shown in Figure 14, shows all the common features need-
ed across all classes, protocols, and hardware models. The NS3 network contains the 
packet, sockets, and the nodes object models. Other components, which are sub-classes 
of the main component, are the mobility models, high-level wrappers, smart pointers, 
call-backs and tracing among others. As stated in the documentation, tracing gives users 
the freedom to select the events to monitor, using complex logic to decide which infor-
mation to log to the trace file or to carry out inline statistical calculations. Call-back of-
41 
 
fers dependencies for each module by ensuring pairing between different simulators 
with the help of the call-back API. The node class is designed as the base class and can 
also be instantiated. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Typical NS3 Architecture (Waleed Ahmed 2015) 
 
The NS3 is among the fastest simulators, cleanly designed, flexible, scalable, and with 
no graphical user interface to build network topology. 
 
4.1.2. The Technologies 
 
NS3 is built on C++ library to offer a streak of network simulation models. It is carried 
out as C++ objects, which are abstracted in python. Users are given the privilege to use 
or communicate with this library by coding in C++ or python to activate series of 
simulation models in order to simulate the desired situation as described in the 
documentation. The technologies, as shown in Figure 15, involved comprise of libraries 
such as Standard Template Library (STL), which is written in C++ and activates some 
parts of C++ standard library; and the C++ or python applications are the libraries that 
the users usually communicate with to create instances of various simulation models in 
order to carry out any simulation design of choice. 
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Figure 15.  NS3 Key Technologies (NS3, 2017) 
 
 
4.1.3. The TCP Models 
 
The TCP models are explained in the NS3 documentation, where it was indicated that 
they are designed to suit the different TCP applications. The applications use specific 
common header classes from the source/network directory, which allows the users’ 
codes to interchange the applications with the least change to the script. There are three 
available TCP applications, which are: an inherently harnessed TCP for NS3, the assist 
for the network simulation cradle (NSC), and the assist for direct code execution (DCE). 
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Figure 16.  TCP State machine (IBM Corporation, 2013) 
 
The TCP state machine as shown in Figure 16 above can be described as the life stages 
of a TCP connection, and the alteration of the states upon the acknowledgement of the 
different events from either the network or local TCP sockets implementation (IBM 
Corporation, 2013). The three types of messages that control transitions between TCP 
states are the synchronize (SYN), Finish (FIN) and Acknowledgment (ACK) messages. 
SYN synchronizes sequence numbers between devices, used to launch, and build a con-
nection, while FIN shows that a device demands for connection termination, and ACK 
shows that a message is received (Kozierok Charles M. 2005). 
 
 Many different TCP state machine states exist, and they are as described as follows 
(Kozierok Charles M. 2005): 
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i. Closed: It is the main state where a connection begins ahead of the connection 
establishment. 
ii. Listen: The server is waiting to receive SYN message from a client.  
iii. Syn_rcvd: Await ACK to its SYN to complete the connection set up. 
iv. Syn_sent: Client has sent SYN message and waiting for a similar message from 
the server. 
v. Established: It is a steady state when data can be exchanged between both devic-
es. 
vi. Fin_wait_1: Device waiting for an ACK to a FIN it has sent. 
vii. Fin_wait_2: Device received an ACK for its connection termination request and 
now waiting for a similar FIN from the other device. 
viii. Close_wait: When a device received a FIN message from the other device. 
ix. Last_ACK: Device already sent own FIN message and waiting for an ACK to its 
request. The device already received a close request.  
 
It is not only limited to these given states, rather, these states incorporate more sub-
events and transitions that occur between them. 
 
The TCP sockets interaction with the application layer interface shows that the callback 
is triggered by the socket. The two functions of the socket are depicted by the sender 
and receiver which can be implemented at the same time. The TCP protocol uses con-
gestion control to maximize the channel potentials for all nodes, connected to it by 
steadily increasing the rates, at which packets are being sent until congestion occurs in 
the network. 
 
 
4.2. EstiNet 
 
One of the most common network simulation and emulation tools is EstiNet. It is a 
software with a graphical user interface to simulate both wired and wireless network 
with real-life applications. And it in addition has some important attributes and 
advantages, such as the usage of the real-life protocol stacks, the capability to allow re-
45 
 
al-life Linux network applications, and the ability to communicate with the real-life 
network devices. 
 
4.2.1. EstiNet Simulation Architecture 
 
The EstiNet architecture as shown in Figure 17 below, is divided into three segments; 
namely the GUI, the Dispatcher and the Simulation Server. The graphical user interface 
client allows the user to draw, edit, run and playback simulation animation. The GUI 
offers the user the freedom to plot performance graphs and specifies parameters on the 
protocol module among many others. The job dispatcher is used for coordination, as it 
coordinates several simulation machines on the EstiNet. The dispatcher also picks the 
accessible machines to carry out the simulation of the network, and if none is accessible, 
it puts the simulation in the queue. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Typical EstiNet Architecture (Bernard Pasquier 2014) 
 
Finally, the coordinator communicates directly with the job dispatcher, notifying the 
dispatcher which machine is in use or idle. The coordinator then receives tasks from the 
dispatcher and hands-over the specific protocol or network simulation to the simulation 
server. 
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For the Fedora operating system to work effectively with the software, the kernel is 
being modified by the inventive network simulator and emulator for wireless and 
mobile networks (NCTUns) so that the simulation server is able to work efficiently on 
it. This works in a manner that the simulation time is activated during simulation instead 
of the real-time timer. 
 
4.2.2. EstiNet Flow Components 
 
Open Flow (OF) Switch 
 
In a software-defined network (SDN), this is responsible for the forwarding representa-
tion. There are three layers of abstraction, which are the specification, distribution and 
forwarding. The specification makes the application to show the exact network behav-
iour without implementation, while distribution protects the SDN applications from the 
distributed states and centralizing the distributed logical control. It is stated in the 
documentation, that the processing pipeline is responsible for packets flow. Finally, the 
forwarding permits forward behaviour by the network while hiding the hidden hardware 
specifications (Richard Ma 2015). 
 
 
 Figure 18.  Typical OF Switch (Ma Richard 2015) 
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From the architecture shown in Figure 18 above, it could be seen that OF Switch has 
one group table, and one or more flow tables, that carry out packet forwarding and cor-
rections, and a protected OpenFlow channels, that offer communication between the 
controller and the OpenFlow switches (Bhargavi Goswami et al 2017). Flow table is the 
basic data structure in an OpenFlow device, and each flow table consists of a group of 
flow entries. Flow tables altogether enable the appliance to check incoming packets ac-
cording to a certain file, and carry out an appropriate action based on the contents of the 
packet information being received. Flow entries prioritize packets order by matching 
entries in each table that are being used. If a similar entry is found, the instructions re-
lated to the specific flow are carried out either to forward to a certain port; drop, flood to 
all ports; or move to the next flow table. If otherwise, the result depends on the configu-
ration of the switch.  
 
i. Operation Flow  
 
The simulator operation flow has four different modes depicted as D, E, R and P in 
which D stands for the Draw topology mode, the E is the Edit property mode, R is the 
Run simulation and P for the Playback respectively. This is shown in Figure 19 below. 
 
 
Figure 19.  Typical EstiNet flow diagram 
 
Drawing topology must be activated at first before the user could be allowed to have 
access to the nodes in favour of setting up the desired networks. The nodes take the 
form of point to point connections. Once the drawing is enabled, the edit property is ac-
tivated, and the running program on the GUI will automatically create subnets under a 
fixed network. At that time, the nodes will be assigned IP and MAC addresses, and 
users will be allowed to add or modify the parameters on the nodes. The next mode in 
the list is the run simulation mode, which upon activation proceeds with running the 
configuration. It first generates a .sim directory, and then it exports the created configu-
ration file describing the simulation scenario. The .result file is created automatically 
48 
 
after the simulation is completed, which is the same as the topology file. The playback 
mode is activated when the simulation server sends back the simulation result files to 
the GUI program for storage in the .result directory. 
 
 
4.3. Ettercap 
 
Ettercap is a full access network sniffer package for the Man-in-the-Middle attacks 
(MitM) simulation. The package has distinctive attributes for detecting live connections, 
its contents, and other properties. Ettercap works with both active and passive analysis 
of many networks, and hosts’ protocols. Active attacks are the type of attacks where at-
tackers try to change the system resources or rather wipe out the information, e.g., ARP 
poisoning, MitM, DoS, or others. On the other hand, passive attacks are the monitoring 
attacks, where the attacker gains access to the information without altering them, e.g., 
Port scanning, idle scan. 
 
Ettercap has two sniffing choices, the unified and bridge sniffing. In the former choice, 
the unified sniffing, all packets flowing through the wired or wireless link are detected, 
while the other packets not linked to the host on the ettercap will be directed 
automatically using network layer routing. This will allow someone to use MitM attack 
on different tools, and packets can be captured and modified by Ettercap. With the latter 
choice, bridge sniffing, upon activation, traffic is sent from one interface to the other 
during sniffing or filtering.  
 
4.3.1. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Poisoning 
 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is a layer 3 protocol, which works by releasing 
ARP request packets. An ARP request taking the form of IP address is sent to all hosts 
in the network, to find out which host holds the given IP address. The host with that 
specific broadcast IP address replies with its MAC address. Every ARP packet broad-
cast is saved on the operating system’s cache to reduce the number of broadcasts. The 
operating system regularly updates its cache when there is a new IP/MAC broadcast. 
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Figure 20.  ARP Poisoning Process (Rickard Cayla 2015) 
 
The MitM attacks happen when an attacker illegally positions own self between legally 
authorized users, so as to be able to be stealing or modifying information being ex-
changed either between or among them. The poisoning process in the MitM attack, as in 
Figure 20, occurs in a manner that, when ARP requests are sent to the target host to poi-
son its ARP cache, it changes the Ethernet MAC address into the attacker’s known 
MAC address to monitor the traffic. When the target has been poisoned, it will send all 
its packets to the attacker's device, which in turn forward the stolen information to the 
real destination and acts like a legitimate user. The attacker’s machine thereby acts like 
a legitimate user during the communication process. 
 
 
4.4. Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) 
 
Another tool for the simulation of data security attacks is DVWA, and it is a PHP-
MySQL damn susceptible web application and it is a free software available on GitHub 
(DVWA team). The application is an Internet-based tool, that is used for teaching, and 
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to assist researchers understanding the techniques involved in securing web applications 
in a legitimate environment. It is also designed to practise other cloud attacks such as 
SQL injection, Brute force, and others in a virtual environment as it could be done in the 
real and legal environment. 
 
4.4.1. SQL Injection Architecture 
 
The browser is used as an interface to user input, and for the process of users’ valida-
tion. The web application running on the web server authenticates inputs, handles the 
exception, allows the user into the system, and offers safe configuration. The architec-
ture is as shown in Figure 21 below.  
 
 
Figure 21.  SQL Injection Architecture (Satyam Singh 2015) 
 
In this architecture, the applications run on the application server for keeping logging 
activities, auditing, and validating crucial activities. This is followed by the database 
running on the database server which handles the security of the data by encrypting and 
hashing of crucial data (Satyam Singh 2015). 
 
4.4.2. The procedure  
 
There are two different conditions by which SQL injection attacks can occur, these are: 
through a relational database that uses SQL, and by controllable user input which is 
used exactly as in an SQL query (Govinda Raj 2017). 
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Figure 22.  How SQL Injection works (Govinda Raj) 
Attackers use SQL injection to manipulate data stored on a database or alter its integrity 
to render the data useless. The method could also be used to create vulnerability into the 
system, making deletion of data from the database possible. This SQL injection 
weakness could make all the data on the database server available to the attacker. The 
working steps, by which an attacker can send a query to the victim database in order to 
steal precious data, are as shown in Figure 22 above. From the figure, the attacker sends 
malicious data to the victim’s server to query his database; if the database is not well 
secured or configured, the attacker will be able to receive valuable information about 
the victim, but if otherwise, the database will not return anything to the attacker’s 
machine.  
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5. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter explains the experimental steps and analysis of the NS3, EstiNet, Damn 
Vulnerable Web Application, and Ettercap. The section studies the simulation perfor-
mance metrics, systems and software used, the experimental model details, and the sim-
ulation performance results. This provides the evaluation metrics of the simulations of 
the network model on the network simulators. 
  
 
5.1. DDoS- TCP Flooding using NS3 
 
The system requirements for the NS3 simulation are as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 5. NS3 System and Software requirements 
System 
and 
Software 
 Details  
Operating 
Systems 
 
 
Linux Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, Intel Celeron 
Quad Core Processor N2940 @1.83GHz., 
64-bit Operating System 
 
NS3 ns-allinone-3.27 
 
 
5.1.1. Simulation Topology 
 
To achieve this, a network of twenty nodes having ten nodes at each end of a compro-
mised link is implemented as shown in Figure 23 in order to analyse the TCP variant, 
measure nodes throughputs and the congestion size. 
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Figure 23.  Point-to-point Network Topology 
 
 
 
Figure 24.  Simulation Topology on NetAnim 
 
CALCULATION: 
Data rate: 5 Mbps 
Delay: 2ms 
Throughput is calculated with this declaration; 
i->second.rxBytes * 8.0 / (i->second.timeLastRxPacket.GetSeconds() - i-
>second.timeFirstTxPacket.GetSeconds())/1024/1024   
 
The First time is calculated by; 
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i->second.timeFirstRxPacket.GetSeconds() 
 
The last time is calculated using; 
 
i->second.timeLastTxPacket.GetSeconds() 
 
The received bytes; 
 
i->second.rxBytes 
 
Simulating the netAnim topology shown in Figure 24 above, which is an animated ver-
sion of the topology drawn in Figure 23. NetAnim gives the following results, as shown 
in Figure 25 below which is a visualized animation similar to Figure 24 earlier in the 
simulation process, showing how packets are flowing in the network, in and out of one 
node to the other, and with which the performance metrics are measured. 
 
: /home/ns3/ns-allinone-3.27/ns-3.27# ./waf  --run “scratch/nbeck-wireless-tcp --
nRightWifi = n≤10 –nLeftWifi=n≤10” --viz 
 
 
Figure 25.  DDoS Simulation on Netanim 
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5.1.2. Performance Metrics 
 
Node throughput is the number of packets received at the nodes and is measured in 
Mbps. The congestion control is the highest number of unauthorized packets that can be 
sent through a link, measured in bytes on Congestion Window (CWND), and its respon-
siveness is measured in milliseconds (ms).  
 
 
Figure 26.  DDos Link Congestion with 10 nodes 
 
The simulation was firstly carried out with ten nodes to see the effect of the link bottle-
neck on the nodes as plotted in the graph shown in Figure 26 above. It is observed that 
the link congestion caused a sharp drop of the packets after approximately 38s, and 
steadily dropped from 8000 bytes, 100 bytes and 300 bytes at 40s, 42s and 43s respec-
tively. This explains the effect of the TCP variant on the link causing the bottleneck, 
thereby resulting in packet drop and subsequently affecting the quality of service.  
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Figure 27.  DDos Link Congestion at 16 nodes 
 
From Figure 27, the number of nodes was increased to 16 to see their effect. Here, the 
simulation starts at around 4s. It is noticed that the packets dropped from 18000 bytes to 
less than 2000 bytes at around 38s and there was a little fluctuation, between 39s and 
40s, where the packets sharply increased to 2000bytes but later dropped to 0 bytes at 
41s. The drop at the congestion was because of the TCP variant due to the bottlenecks 
in the link. 
 
 
Figure 28.  DDos Link Congestion at 18 nodes 
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 In Figure 28 earlier, the number of nodes was increased to 18. It is noticed that there 
was a sharp change in the congestion, the packets dropped from around 21000bytes to 
100 bytes at 44 seconds and later to 0 byte at 45s. It is observed that the more the nodes, 
the more the time it takes for the congestion to occur. 
 
Table 6 below shows the network throughput of the nodes with their corresponding re-
ceived and transmitted times. This gives a clearer picture of what is happening in the 
network per time. 
 
Table 6.  Network Throughputs data 
 
 
It can also be deduced from the table, that the link congestion increases as the number 
of the nodes increases. There was abnormal behaviour when the number of nodes was 
12, 10 and 6; however, it is observed that the throughputs do not follow the sequence. 
This behaviour is due to the system error or fluctuation in the simulation. 
 
Figure 29 shows the graphical representation of the increase in the network throughput 
and the number of nodes. Though the original data rate of 5Mbps was truncated to the 
average of around 0.1Mbps. 
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Figure 29.  Network Throughput on graph 
 
 
5.2. DDoS on EstiNet 
 
The system and software recommendation for the simulation of the distributed denial of 
service using EstiNet is given in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7. EstiNet System and Software requirements 
System and 
Software 
Details 
Operating 
Systems 
Fedora 20 
Intel Celeron Quad Core Processor 
N2940 @1.83GHz. 
64-bit Operating System 
 
EstiNet EstiNet 9.0 
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5.2.1. Set up and Metrics 
 
This section discusses the steps required to set up the EstiNet working environment and 
the topology for the simulation. The considered metrics, the nodes output/ throughput is 
measured in kilobyte per seconds (kBps) 
 
The DDoS Botnet Simulator tool, Bonesi-0.3, is used to simulate Botnet Traffic to learn 
the effect of DDoS attacks on Internet networks in a testbed environment. It induces 
ICMP, TCP (HTTP), and UDP flow attacks from the user-defined botnet size (different 
IP addresses). Other parameters such as data volume, source IP address, URLs and 
others can be also configured. The tool is so robust that it has the capability of 
generating up to 50,000 IP addresses randomly. 
 
 
Figure 30.  DDoS Topology on EstiNet 
 
The network topology in Figure 30 is implemented to carry out the simulation. On the 
attacker’s workstation, an ICMP, TCP and UDP flow attack is defined at port 8000. 
This is according to the user-defined botnet size and is as shown in Figure 31.  
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Figure 31.  Attack configuration 
 
The host’s workstation configuration is as shown in Figure 32 below. As seen, the host 
runs the Sensor Transmission Protocol (STCP), which is a transport layer protocol, au-
thorized by the TCP, where most of its functions are applied at the base station. This 
will run every 30 seconds.  
 
 
Figure 32.  Host configuration 
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The server workstation is configured to run the Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) for 
30sec as shown in Figure 33. The RTP is responsible for offering point-to-point real-
time data transmission (Schulzrinne et al 2003: p19). 
 
 
Figure 33.  Server configuration 
 
The OpenFlow controller runs the Parallel TCP (PTCP) protocol. It is configured as 
shown in Figure 34 to run nox_core -I ptcp:  switch. The PTCP is a point-to-point 
transport layer protocol, which enables a link to bask in the cumulative bandwidth 
resulted by different network paths, regardless of the attribute of the paths (Hsieh Hung-
Yun et al 2002). 
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Figure 34.  OpenFlow Controller configuration 
 
On the Open Flow Switch, the network IP is modified as in Figure 35. This will allow 
the Open Flow controller and host workstation to be on the same network. 
 
 
Figure 35.  OF Switch configuration 
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To import the simulation data to the graph, MAC module is activated in the node editor, 
then log packet statistics are enabled. This will allow the user to select any input or out-
put of interest. The generated transport traffic generated by bonesi at the configured 
nodes 1,2,3 and 6 is as shown in Figure 36 below. The figure also shows the type of 
protocol running on each node. 
 
 
Figure 36.  Network traffic generator 
 
 
5.2.2. EstiNet Results 
 
The server input throughput is shown in Figure 37 below. The input throughput of 
around 1.2MBps 
 
 
Figure 37.  Host Server Input Throughput 
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 The network throughput at the server is as shown in Figure 38. The figure shows the 
network after being compromised by TCP flood attacks. As could be seen, the network 
output dropped to approximately 35kBps compared to 1.2MBps as in the previous fig-
ure. This shows a great drop in the network packet and might result in network instabil-
ity. 
 
 
Figure 38.  Host Server Throughput 
 
The input traffic at both stations, the host and the server, is the same at 1.2MBps. This is 
displayed in Figure 39 below. 
 
 
Figure 39.  Host Input Throughput 
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The network output at the host is also dropped to approximately 35kBps. This tremen-
dous drop in the network efficiency is shown in the node 3 throughput graph as in Fig-
ure 40 below.  
 
 
Figure 40.  Host Throughput 
 
Comparing the output at both stations, the host and the server, it is observed that the in-
put throughput at both workstations has the same value of 1.2MBps and network output 
throughput of 35kBps as shown in Figure 41 below. 
 
 
Figure 41.  Host and Server Throughput 
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5.3. Damn Vulnerable Web Application for SQL Injection 
 
There are four different levels of security on DVWA, namely low, medium, high, and 
impossible. These levels correspond to how easier it is to gain access to the information 
stored on the DVWA database. The testing database is designed with five default users, 
and queries are injected into the database to steal their usernames, passwords, as well as 
other vital information. Table 8 below shows the installation system and software re-
quirements for DVWA. 
 
Table 8. DVWA System and Software requirements 
System and Software Details 
Operating Systems Linux Ubuntu 16.04 LTS 
Intel Celeron Quad Core 
Processor N2940 
@1.83GHz. 
64-bit Operating System 
 
Damn Vulnerability 
Web Application 
DVWA 
 
 
5.3.1. Results 
 
After the installation, the four different levels, the low, medium, high, and the impossi-
ble can be tested. These test results shown in Figures 43, 44 and 45, were carried out at 
the low-level security for quick understanding of the concept. The other levels, medium 
and high, can be carried out by making few changes to the DVWA source codes accord-
ingly. For example, to carry out any test with the medium level SQL Injection, the fol-
lowing steps as stated in the Oracle documentation should be taken: 
i. inside the source code, allow mysql_real_escape_string() to call mysql, which 
sorts `\’ to these characters, \x00,\n,\r,\,´, AND \x1a, and  
ii. use post request and binding to the specific input options. 
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iii. then release the database.  
For high-level security, Java assistance script query is used, which will add limit to out-
put results, while the impossible level security level is such a situation, that the SQL 
Injection is not possible to be executed. This is because the database structure is well 
formed and protected.  
 
The vulnerability of the database is tested by issuing the query, 1’. If the database is 
vulnerable, it will return a value, the user whose ID is equal to 1, but the query will 
return error or null if it is not vulnerable. Figure 42 below shows model database to be 
exploited. 
 
 
 
Figure 42.  Database Interface 
 
To exploit these vulnerabilities, the following tasks were performed. Firstly, get the list 
of all users on the database using this command; 1’ OR 1=1 # 
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Figure 43.  List of Users on the database 
 
The user with ID = 2 is Gordon Brown 
 
Figure 44.  User with ID = 2 
 
To retrieve Gordon’s username and password, 
1’ OR 1=1 UNION SELECT username, password FROM users WHERE user_ID=2 #  
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Figure 45.  Username and password for use with ID=2 
 
This encrypted password in MD5 hash could be broken using Dan’s tools for the MD5 
hash generator. 
 
 
5.4. Ettercap for MitM Attack 
 
The system requirements and the network sniffing tool used for this simulation are as 
displayed in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Ettercap System and Software requirements 
System and 
Software 
Details 
Operating 
Systems 
Linux Ubuntu 16.04 LTS 
Intel Celeron Quad Core 
Processor N2940 
@1.83GHz. 
64-bit Operating System 
 
Ettercap ettercap 0.8.2 
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5.4.1. Topology 
 
The network topology implemented for the simulation is shown in Figure 46. As seen, 
the network consists of the attacker’s machine, on which Ettercap is running, and the 
victim machines. The attacker’s machine, at the middle of the connection, will be steal-
ing information being shared between the communicating Host1 and Host2. 
 
 
Figure 46.  Man-in-the-middle attack topology 
 
 
5.4.2. The set up on Ettercap 
 
Activate the Unified sniffing for the Ettercap, to unify the attacker’s machine MAC ad-
dress with the legitimate user’s machine MAC address, such that the server will not be 
able to distinguish the intruder’s machine from the legitimate machine on the network. 
Activating the sniffing connection, it activates the vulnerability in the network so that 
layer 3 protocols could be tracked.  This configuration will activate two-way poisoning, 
that is from the server to host-attacker and vice versa.  
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5.4.3. Results 
 
On the Ettercap 0.8.2, as shown in Figure 47, the attacker’s machine matches the IP ad-
dress of the authorized hosts to its own MAC address table on the network before estab-
lishing a false connection, poisoning the network, to steal data being communicated be-
tween the two legitimates hosts on the network. 
 
 
Figure 47.  ARP Poisoning 
 
The network traffic was captured using Wireshark as shown in Figure 48 when the 
sniffer was activated. On the Wireshark, we can see all the traffic on the network, the 
established connections and the activities on the connected hosts as captured on the 
attacker’s machine. 
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Figure 48.  ARP poisoning traffic on Wireshark 
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6. CONCLUSION  
 
The importance and increase in the amount of data being transferred and saved have 
given birth to the idea of cloud computing. The technology has been offering lots of 
benefits to companies and organizations to own any cloud services of their choice and 
allows them to have access to their data regardless of the location at any time over the 
Internet. The security of the data has been the challenge to the cloud service providers, 
since data is kept in different places, and the fact that it needs to be always accessible to 
customers upon demand. It is observed in this work that the communication channels, 
storage infrastructure and the data itself are the target areas for the attackers. The data at 
the three different states, at rest, on motion and in use, suffer from various types of at-
tacks, among which are the DDoS, ARP poisoning, password phishing, database injec-
tion and others. The main reasons why these attacks are carried out, are to tamper with 
the integrity, availability and the confidentiality of the data. 
 
From the results of the simulation conducted in this work using simulating tools such as 
NS3, Ettercap, EstiNet and DVWA, so that more light is shed on the impact of these 
attacks on data, and network resources for our better understanding. The DDoS targets 
the availability of the resources by affecting the network throughput, and reducing the 
amount of the transmitted packets, thereby degrading the quality and availability of the 
given service. On the EstiNet simulation, it was observed, that the attacker infected the 
network with around 1.2MBps of traffic, which led the server and host workstation to be 
compromised with the packet loss to around 0.05kBps on the average. Similar scenarios 
are also witnessed on the NS3 simulation where the communication between the links 
was congested, the communication output in the network dropped from 5Mbps to 
0.012Mbps and packets drop. 
 
In the same vein, confidentiality of the stored data was compromised when the Ettercap 
was used to poison a network by sniffing the information being transmitted between au-
thorized users. With this, it is obvious to observe the importance of secured communica-
tion links. The attack is aimed at the network layer to sniff packets moving to-and-from 
in the network. This kind of attack compromises the network, making communication 
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between the legitimate users and/or the server prone to attack. The communication be-
tween users was captured using Wireshark when Ettercap was set up as an attacker on 
the network. The transmitted information was captured and attackers could easily use it 
against the legal user or for other personal use. 
 
Finally, the integrity of a data is put at risk when an unauthorized user could be able to 
steal or manipulate valuable information from a database. This was explained using the 
DVWA simulation conducted in this work. As it is known that database is one of the 
most sensitive areas on a cloud system where bad configuration, and inappropriate secu-
rity measures on this area will open it to attacks, and which will be detrimental to the 
integrity of the organization. 
 
Some security techniques solutions were discussed in chapter 3 of this work as well, 
which have been in use, such as the cryptographic techniques; for the cloud attacks, da-
tabase security, and digital signature; and offering solutions to protect data in the cloud. 
The effective implementation of these techniques and putting other security measures in 
place will help in securing important and valuable data in the cloud, regardless of the 
place where they are located and saved for easy access.  
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